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This research note investigates the question of whether taxpayers are more socially
distant from the Tax Office in some states than in others. The greater the social distance,
the less likely it is that a tax authority will be able to persuade taxpayers to behave in
certain ways, the less likely it is that taxpayers will effectively self-regulate their own
behaviour, and the less likely it is that taxpayers will fear sanctions imposed by the Tax
Office. Social distance is therefore a useful concept for tax authorities to understand.
Motivational postures are composites of attitudes, beliefs, interests, and preferences that
represent the social distance individuals wish to place between themselves and the
authority. Motivational postures signal openly to the authority and to others how
regulatees feel about the regulatory system, whether they believe it is worthwhile or not,
whether regulatees feel comfortable with the authority and if they are predisposed to do
what the authority wants. Five motivational postures have been identified, not as fixed,
static and mutually exclusive orientations but as options that come into play as the
situation allows. They are commitment (the notion that contributing to the tax system is
the right thing to do and benefits all); capitulation (the notion that the authority will treat
taxpayers the right way as long as they do what is required); resistance (the notion that
the tax authority is out to get taxpayers and can never be satisfied); disengagement (the
notion that the authority can’t do anything to the taxpayer to cause a sleepless night); and
game playing (the notion that the tax authority and taxpayers each play for the grey in tax
law and enjoy it).
Multi-item scales have been developed to measure these five postures (Braithwaite, 2003)
(see Table 1 for sample items). When scores on these fives scales of commitment,
capitulation, resistance, disengagement, and game playing are intercorrelated and factor
analysed, two separate dimensions emerge. The first dimension is bipolar with one end
defined by commitment to the tax system and capitulation to the tax authority, while the
other end is defined by resistance. This first factor is called cooperation-resistance
meaning the degree to which the individual is prepared to support the tax system and
submit to its authority.  The second dimension represents the degree to which the Tax
Office is seen as having the status of an authority, that is, having the right to direct the
behaviour of the taxpayer (dissociation).
The motivational postures are described in Table 1 below.
2Table 1 Posture Description and Sample Item
Posture Description Sample Item
Commitment Belief in the tax system as a
means of securing the common
good
‘I accept responsibility for
paying my fair share of tax’
Capitulation An acceptance of the Tax Office
as a legitimate authority
‘No matter how cooperative or
uncooperative the Tax Office is,
the best policy is to always be
cooperative with them’
Resistance Attributing negative and harmful
intentions to the Tax Office –
they are out ‘to get’ the taxpayer
‘It’s important not to let the Tax
Office push you around’
Disengagement A widespread disenchantment
with the system whereby
individuals have ‘given up’ on
the Tax Office and tax system
‘I don’t care if I am not doing the
right thing by the Tax Office’
Game playing Perception of the Tax Office as a
partner in playing and finding
ways to use the law to one’s own
advantage
‘The Tax Office respects
taxpayers who can give them a
run for their money’
Each motivational posture is based upon responses to a five item scale of 1 - Strongly
disagree, 2 - Disagree, 3 - Neither, 4 - Agree and 5 - Strongly agree. Consequently the
postures can be represented as either percentages of those who support the posture the
majority of the time (respondents whose composite survey answers to the posture were
Agree or Strongly Agree) or mean scores. While the percentage responses are intuitively
easier to understand they are not as statistically strong as the mean scores. Both
percentages (Tables 2 and 3) and means (Tables 4 and 5) have been included below.
When the posture percentages were compared across states significant differences were
found in Capitulation (2000), Commitment (2002) and Resistance (2002) (Tables 2 and
3). Given that these Chi-square comparisons of percentages are not considered as robust
as means these findings were not deemed clear-cut and means were referred to. Virtually
no significant differences emerged in the posture means (see Tables 4 and 5). The only
differences were found for capitulation in 2000. The states that were lowest on
capitulation means were Northern Territory, Western Australia and Victoria.
3Table 2 Posture percentages by state (Postures measured in 2000) for those who support
each posture strongly or most of the time
States
Posture NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT Chi-
square
Commitment 92% 94% 89% 91% 93% 89% 93% NS
Capitulation 76% 70% 73% 82% 69% 81% 61% 17.4**
Resistance 55% 53% 59% 57% 53% 44% 62% NS
Disengagement 7% 7% 7% 3% 7% 8% 4% NS
Game playing 14% 14% 14% 11% 14% 13% 13% NS
Cooperation -
resistance
84% 83% 78% 87% 81% 86% 79% NS
Disassociation 6% 7% 8% 6% 6% 6% 2% NS
**    p < .01
Table 3 Posture percentages by state (Postures measured in 2002) for those who support
each posture strongly or most of the time
States
Posture NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT Chi-
square
Commitment 95% 98% 94% 97% 95% 97% 80% 19.8**
Capitulation 73% 75% 74% 82% 63% 79% 76% NS
Resistance 58% 48% 54% 48% 51% 61% 24% 17.1**
Disengagement 6% 8% 7% 5% 8% 9% 4% NS
Game playing 11% 9% 8% 10% 5% 15% 8% NS
Cooperation -
resistance
87% 85% 85% 89% 77% 94% 76% NS
Disassociation 5% 7% 6% 8% 6% 12% 4% NS
**    p < .01
4Table 4 Posture means by state (Postures measured in 2000)
States
Posture NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT
Commitment 3.87 3.88 3.82 3.79 3.87 3.85 3.89
Capitulation 3.42 3.37 3.41 3.50 3.37 3.53 3.30*
Resistance 3.17 3.17 3.22 3.18 3.20 3.06 3.16
Disengagement 2.31 2.31 2.33 2.37 2.30 2.23 2.18
Game playing 2.44 2.42 2.47 2.45 2.33 2.44 2.39
Cooperation -
resistance
3.37 3.36 3.34 3.37 3.34 3.44 3.35
Disassociation 2.38 2.36 2.41 2.41 2.32 2.34 2.28
*    p < .05
Table 5 Posture means by state (Postures measured in 2002)
States
Posture NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT
Commitment 3.99 3.98 3.96 3.91 3.93 4.05 3.81
Capitulation 3.39 3.41 3.42 3.53 3.30 3.51 3.42
Resistance 3.18 3.12 3.16 3.10 3.19 3.11 2.97
Disengagement 2.26 2.31 2.29 2.27 2.27 2.17 2.16
Game playing 2.33 2.27 2.30 2.32 2.29 2.51 2.30
Cooperation -
resistance
3.40 3.42 3.41 3.44 3.35 3.48 3.42
Disassociation 2.29 2.29 2.30 2.29 2.28 2.34 2.23
5Are there other regional differences?
While the approach of ATO Offices in each state do not vary in terms of the social
distance that exists between themselves and their taxpayers, differences emerged between
rural and urban taxpayers within states. These findings are consistent with our
understanding of motivational postures. While each of us may have a comfort zone
regarding our preferred motivational posture, activities by the Tax Office - particularly
field activities - should nudge us out of our comfort zone. It is difficult to imagine an
ATO Office embarking on activities that affect all taxpayers in a state in a way that is
distinctly different from the way another state’s ATO Office is engaging with their
taxpayers. It is conceivable, however, that groups of taxpayers within a state are targeted
for intervention of some kind. We have no information on the interventions that may have
taken place with rural taxpayers in different states in 2000 and 2002, but the pattern of
results is consistent with the hypothesis that interventions of some kind were occurring.
These interventions, of course, may not have involved the Tax Office directly. The Tax
Office may have borne the brunt of dissatisfaction with other aspects of government
policy. The tables below show that within several states, motivational postures differ at
the two time periods for rural and urban respondents. There were no significant
differences found between rural and urban respondents in Tasmania, South Australia and
the Northern Territory.
Table 6 Mean scores and significant differences on motivational postures for two groups
defined as urban and rural for the year 2000 and 2002 for New South Wales
State Year 2000 Year 2002
NSW Group Group
Urban Rural T-value Urban Rural T-value
Commitment 3.90 3.77 2.62** - - -
Disengagement 2.28 2.38 -2.03* - - -
* p < .05     ** p < .01
Table 7 Mean scores and significant differences on motivational postures for two groups
defined as urban and rural for the year 2000 and 2002 for Victoria
State Year 2000 Year 2002
VIC Group Group
Urban Rural T-value Urban Rural T-value
Commitment - - - 4.02 3.88 2.19*
Disengagement - - - 2.26 2.42 -2.21*
* p < .05     ** p < .01
6Table 8 Mean scores and significant differences on motivational postures for two groups
defined as urban and rural for the year 2000 and 2002 for Queensland
State Year 2000 Year 2002
QLD Group Group
Urban Rural T-value Urban Rural T-value
Commitment 3.87 3.74 2.15* - - -
Resistance 3.15 3.33 -2.86** - - -
Disengagement 2.27 2.42 -2.74** - - -
Game playing - - - 2.21 2.42 -2.61**
* p < .05     ** p < .01
Table 9 Mean scores and significant differences on motivational postures for two groups
defined as urban and rural for the year 2000 and 2002 for Western Australia
State Year 2000 Year 2002
WA Group Group
Urban Rural T-value Urban Rural T-value
Capitulation 3.30 3.52 -2.40* - - -
* p < .05     ** p < .01
Summary
In summary, there were no significant differences between states in social distance from
the ATO. There was, at different survey times (2000 and 2002), some differences
between rural and urban taxpayers within states; however these data do not allow us to
speculate on the reason for the differences.
